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1The epistemological and philosophical situation
of Mind Techno-Science
Alain-Marc Rieu
First version : Stanford Humanities Review, Special issue: Constructions of the mind: Artificial
Intelligence and the Humanities, vol. 4, n° 2, 1995, pp 267-284.
In Stefano Franchi and Güven Güzeldere (ed.), Mechanical Bodies, Computational Minds.
Artificial Intelligence from Automata to Cyborgs, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 2005, p 453-470.
1- The objective and the persective
My objective is to examine the philosophical relevance of Mind Techno-Science (MTS), why
philosophy finds itself in a paradoxical situation where it cannot ignore this new field of
knowledge and at the same time has to reinvent itself outside its realm. In order to reach this
objective, it is necessary to clarify the present interactions between artificial intelligence (AI),
cognitive sciences (CS), virtual reality (VR), the Humanities, their present conjuncture (post-
modernism) and other issues that will be progressively conceptualized. The reasons for the
connection of these different fields of research seem obvious, but are in fact less than clear: the
form and content of this connection raise questions that cannot be answered in any one of these
fields alone. To deal with this general problem does not only require to find the proper
information and methodology, it requires an understanding of the epistemic conjuncture   at its
core1. The questions are many, all more or less confused: in what sort of epistemic conjuncture
post-modernism finds itself, why are AI and CS in a situation beyond the reach of their actual
practice but at the same time cannot afford to ignore this, because it concerns their epistemic and
academic environment2.
I hear already the protests from many readers: French fog. Indeed my perspective will appear
at first non-analytical, even anti-analytical. But the overplayed opposition between the two
traditions, in this precise case, takes a distinctly different aspect: it is between clarifying the
already largely debated problems and questioning these very problems through an analysis of
their presuppositions. The risk is fully accepted: my  view concerns the forest more than the trees.
It concerns the forms of argumentation at the root of these problems and the way to deal with
them. A two layers reading scheme is herewith proposed; the first at the level of the global
argument, the second at the level of the various problems crossed by the first one and usually
2discussed by cognitive and AI scientists and philosophers. This perspective asserts that this first
level has its own relative autonomy, that it can be analyzed with a rigor which, regarding its
intrinsic intricacies, satisfies the minimal standards of an analytic tradition. If some parts of the
argument do not seem satisfactory, I hope they can be rectified to open the way to a proper
knowledge. Philosophy in any case cannot pretend to deliver much more.
2- The situation of the Humanities today
My starting point is a common sense question: how can one assert that the various sub-disciplines
covered by the notions of AI and CS are generating knowledge which can be transferred to the
Humanities in order to provide knowledge of what is called mind in this field? Is the transfer able
to preserve the knowledge value of what is being exported from one field to another?
According to present research in philosophy and historical epistemology, in the field called
Humanities, mind is not a substance; it is a function within a symbolic order. This order is
constituted by a hierarchy of different disciplines that has been relatively stable during a certain
period of time, till the end of the 19th century. Indeed, since the 1850's and 1870's, successive
mutations in logic, physics, mathematics have deconstructed this symbolic order to an extent
which seems (at least to me) till today not fully evaluated3. The function at the core of the
symbolic order had been hypostatized by the philosophical tradition in a conception of the mind,
of its capacities (faculties), of its assignments in society, culture and/or civilization. In any case,
the historical hypostatization of this function cannot be taken for a knowledge of the mind, but it
has effectively opened the possibility of transforming the function of the mind into an object of
science, even of experimental investigation from the mid-19th century on.
This function has imparted to the mind different roles, the most important of them being the
origin4 of knowledge through the different faculties the mind was endowed with in order to
satisfy the function it was given within this symbolic order. So the mind came to be known and
understood as the foundation of all sciences. The real sense of this is the following: in return, any
development of sciences and the knowledge they produced are to be referred to the activities of
the mind and herewith contribute both to its development (the historical unfolding of its virtual
capacities) and to its own knowledge. Mind knows itself through the development of the different
forms of knowledge it makes possible.  In this symbolic order5 centered on the function of the
mind, the role of philosophy is essential: its role is to extract from sciences the knowledge of the
mind they carry and to refer to the mind this progress as a deepening6 of the knowledge of itself
necessary to accomplish its assignment. This construction of the mind through its function within
a symbolic order has produced since the 17th century a major ideology: the progress of sciences,
3being a progress of the knowledge of the mind is a progress of all the individual minds and as
such a progress of Humanity or Mankind. In his late works, Husserl has clearly expressed this
idea and the consequences of its regression7.
The Humanities are a set of disciplines at the core of a symbolic order, they are regulated by
philosophy. These disciplines, developed in the intimacy of the modern mind, are supposed to be
its closest expressions8, the fulfilment of its powers, the medium of Humanity. The modern
conception of Man is built up through the Humanities as the presence of the mind in the world9.
Within the Humanities, philosophy is defined as the exercise of Reason. What is Reason? Reason
is supposed to be anchored in the mind as the origin and canon of all its activities; it exhibits and
actualizes itself when it extracts from the different fields of knowledge that which concerns the
mind so that it recognizes itself in its own productions. Reason is the self-reflection of the mind,
the mind in search of itself in its activities. Philosophy, as reason at work in the mind, is the
mental process in which all the different expressions of the mind are related to each other in the
understanding of their origin. Its duty is to associate (even integrate) each individual mind, their
constructs, in the generic mind of Mankind. So philosophy constantly weaves the Humanities
with their different historical patterns, it asserts their coherence within the concept of Man as
origin and end of all knowledge.
In such a brief summary, the argument may appear slightly ridiculous, as strange as a
summary of any myth of an ancient people in the ancient Near-East or Africa. But this mythology
has been repeated for so long in Europe and America, it has produced such wide effects, that its
failure at the end of the 19th century, its fast withdrawal mostly since the 1960’s, leave a void
and a nostalgia that the majority of philosophical research tend simply to fulfil, explicitly or not.
The Mind Techno-Science is reaching philosophy and the Humanities in this precise context.
One idea is to be obtained by this approach à la Foucault. There is no doubt that AI and the CS
are progressively building an effective knowledge of what they define as mind. But in no way
can the inter-discipline emerging at their intersection satisfy the modern function of mind.
Neither their programs, nor their results, nor their internal debates can be interpreted inside the
modern symbolic order, within this hierarchical organisation of different disciplines that had an
endogenic development from the European 16th century till the end of the 19th. This body of
knowledge being effectively produced cannot be referred to the modern mind as being conceived
as the origin of different faculties and at work in the knowledge gained from them. The Mind
Techno-Science cannot have as its goal the deepening of the knowledge Man (the subject of the
Humanities) has of himself as the origin and end of all human things. It cannot pretend to
participate in the spiritual betterment of Humanity10, to restore a vanished order.
The reason why is that the conditions of the formation and coherence of the modern
Humanities are no longer satisfied. The traditional part played by the Humanities in culture and
4society has vanished. The crisis of the Humanities is not only a fashionable theme in the
Humanities departments of the industrial world universities. Since the end of the 19th century,
this is a fact, an epistemic situation, the consequences of which are difficult to fully assess. The
Humanities crisis is the most obvious consequence of a deeper transformation concerning the
symbolic order aggregating inside one another the different fields of knowledge. Physics and
mathematics dropped out in the 1880’s, they did not refer to philosophy anymore and through it
to the activities of a mind: they were building within themselves and by themselves their own
foundations. This explains why the Humanities are nowadays mostly reduced to philosophy, and
philosophy itself divided between a quest for a back seat in the sciences and literary theory.
AI and CS are rising in this very peculiar epistemic conjuncture. A place has been left vacant
to be occupied. Professional philosophers are still being trained in the different modern schools.
A reconstruction of the modern function of philosophy is possible, even anticipated and asked
for: the roads are drawn, the problems are well known (mind/body, mind/brain,
physical/physiological, natural/artificial, etc.). The philosopher E. Husserl even tried at the
beginning of the 20th century to reconstruct the modern conception of philosophy: perhaps he
failed because he did not have a proper conception of mind at his disposal! Now new answers
from the Mind Techno-Science can be provided, they are able to justify the old questions of the
philosophical tradition. A ground knowledge can be deciphered through the controversies of the
scientists and engineers who are ignorant of philosophy. The grand program of a reconstruction
of the Humanities can be designed. The present conjuncture is certainly an ambiguous
opportunity for philosophy, but there is no such place to occupy, no such function to fulfil. The
function has vanished. AI and CS are not coming to save the Humanities. Neither are they going
either to take their place, because philosophy has failed to play its role. The Mind Techno-
Science will not fulfil Husserl's utopia to transform philosophy into a science.
Because of its methodology, problems and criteria, the analytical tradition seems, for the
moment, bound to reconstruct itself in the cognitive sciences: it feels itself independent from the
epistemic conjuncture. Paradoxically, a style of philosophy, coming from research as diverse as
M. Foucault or P. Bourdieu, have the potential to overcome the modern frame of philosophical
problems and even to arrive at the rigor that it has been missing. The Mind Techno-Science
emancipates philosophy from its modern function. This is why it belongs to the post-modern
epistemic conjuncture. The Humanities cannot be revamped by the mind sciences, but only
further deconstructed. Philosophy has to overcome its nostalgia and explore the virtualities of the
present situation, the post-modern experience.
53- The epistemological problem
The epistemic conjuncture is more intricate. Even if AI et CS research is at a loss to provide the
reconstruction of the Humanities, even if this historic mythology is forgotten, the sciences of the
mind raise important epistemological questions. The French epistemological tradition11 holds and
shows that each science develops itself by the construction of its object. Through its concepts,
formalisms and experimental procedures, a theory filters the phenomena and herewith generates a
quasi-object reduced to a set of parameters that can be experimentally studied12. This quasi-
object is not a mental construction, it grows within the development of a theory and its
experimental basis; it indicates the type of properties an object has within a discipline or sub-
discipline. It cannot be separated from the theory to which it is linked and from the instruments
by which this theory develops the different experimentation by which it proves and disproves
itself. Even sciences at a primitive stage of their development, when they are not yet clearly cut
off from folk knowledge, are already constructing a quasi-object. The object of any science is
always, as coined by Bruno Latour13, a "hybrid," indistinctly natural and artificial.
This entails two major consequences. The first one is that it cannot be asserted that reality can
be reduced to what is known by a science. The second is that there is no other way than science to
know what reality is. So the Real (what is reality) cannot be called upon outside of science,
through philosophy, any belief, intuition, theology or poetry. But in return, the different sciences
are not providing societies with a unified or unanimous knowledge of what the reality they study
is by itself. Scientific knowledge cannot be cut off from the methods through which it is
produced: the objects, reality or levels of reality any science investigates is defined by a theory
and its method of experimentation.
From this epistemological point of view, it follows that AI research cannot state what
intelligence is by itself. But intelligence cannot be known outside of the different sciences that are
being built. This is why cognition is the quasi-objet of the mind sciences. Cognition is not the
object they are trying to know as if it existed by itself. Cognition is being constructed according
to the development of these sciences and their interactions. It is a concept by which these
different sciences give an operational name to the quasi-object they are producing. Intelligence,
as the essence of the human mind, has not to be protected from Mind Techno-Science, neither is
it necessary to prove and explain at length that intelligence is not what these sciences are
studying. The epistemological explanation is a sufficient answer that should dry up many popular
(and) philosophical debates rising from the ghost of the Humanities.
The epistemic conjuncture and its problems are much more complex. Indeed the present
epistemological situation of the mind sciences is ambiguous and partly explains the philosophical
temptations above denounced. As they are progressing from computer science models to the
6connectionnist paradigm14, they overcome the initial behaviorist model dictating the processes
being studied: the initial models were simply falsified by the very processes they allowed to
investigate and they had to be refined and new ones were slowly proposed. In this situation, the
mind sciences are requiring a finer description of their quasi-object, based on more complex
conceptual models. The filters have to change and they have been changing in the last fifteen
years. But precisely because these sciences are investigating at the same time by experimentation
and computer simulation, they are not, for the time being, able to define and construct by
themselves this hybrid (cognition, intelligence and their different modalities) which is their quasi-
object. Within their investigation, a type of cognition has to be so drastically reduced that mind
sciences cannot pretend to explain what they are supposed to. At the same time they need a full
conception of this object in order to reduce it to the parameters at their disposal. This is their
present and temporary epistemological deficit15.
So the mind sciences find themselves in the position of requiring a pre-description of their
object16. They have to look for it outside, import it from outside, because they do not yet have the
theoretical means to build the filters in which the effective cognitive or intelligent processes
could be analyzed in related parameters, so that they could be reconstructed and tested. Of
course, this is how hard mind sciences are progressing already, but they are still under the
influence of folk psychology and the pre-description of cognitive behaviors. In any case, the
problem is not that intelligence or cognition cannot become an object of science, but that the
present reduction is too strong and requires to be related to different pre-descriptions outside the
mind sciences.
 But here philosophy enters the game: different historical schools amply provide for the time
being such pre-descriptions, because their linguistic self-reflective methods based on the
potentials of natural logic were the only ones available to describe basic mental processes such as
belief, cognition, attention, perception, intention, etc. Phenomenology and its different trends
provide an important more recent stock of relatively well refined descriptions of mental states
and processes. These schools can provide these badly needed pre-descriptions and their
specialists can revive them and position themselves in the very development of the mind
sciences.
I think this is a false conception of the present situation of philosophy. It is just a way for
modern philosophy to continue its routine and even pretend to provide (unexpected) true
(scientific) answers to old problems. Everybody seems satisfied in this false association: modern
philosophical inquiry seems justified instead of being disqualified, the mind scientists are gaining
some ideological prestige they do not even need. Indeed, if the epistemic conjuncture concerns
the global organisation of knowledge, the epistemological situation concerns the  state of
development of a discipline or of a theory. The epistemological situation of Mind Techno-
7Science explains why it is so concerned with philosophy issues, but it also explains why some
philosophical schools find so much interest in them: they can recycle their presuppositions with
fresh data, launch debates and even provide guidelines or orientations. Epistemology teaches that
the present situation is only a temporary step. The next one is all the more easy to predict,
because it has already happened: the formation of the connectionist paradigm shows how the
mind sciences are becoming able to provide the filters  for their own descriptions of the cognitive
processes they are investigating. They are in the process of reducing their dependence on
linguistic self-descriptions provided by philosophy and folk cognitive psychology.
Connectionism attests the emergence of mind sciences as this autonomous inter-discipline I have
been calling Mind Techno-Science17. A decisive step has been reached.
4- The situation of philosophy in this conjuncture
In such a situation, the domain of modern philosophy is even further contested. The problem is
not at all that the mind has become a proper object of science, that has been the case since the
1850’s. The problem is that the mind sciences have become able to construct themselves outside
of the conception of philosophy which pretends to decide what mind is or is not, if the knowledge
to be gained is possible or not, valid or not. Mind Techno-Science, by becoming autonomous,
implicitly shows that even the analytical approach is neutral regarding its development. Just as
physics and mathematics had become autonomous in the late 19th century, a science and a
technology of the mind have become possible. This Mind Techno-Science cannot even become a
substitute for the Humanities, a ground knowledge: the positivist dream is no longer feasible,
simply because the order of knowledge (the web of interactions between fields of knowledge and
practices) is no longer organized in a way to make it possible. The exercise of philosophy has
become external to the knowledge of mind. Philosophy cannot pretend any longer that mind is its
sanctuary, a strange object appearing to itself when it is described and analyzed by this peculiar
use of language called philosophy. Philosophy finds itself outside the mind, the mind of the
philosophers as well as the mind of Humanity or Mankind. In fact it seems (for the moment at
least) nowhere and everywhere.
This final uprooting of philosophy needs not to be dramatized. In the present situation, the
task of philosophy is certainly difficult to perform but it is at the same time quite obvious. First it
is necessary to avoid any pretended fear or anxiety of (re)constructed mind, virtual (parallel)
reality, artificial (non-natural) intelligence, as if we were waiting for a new Frankenstein under
the cover of a Heideggerian conception of technè. Any form of post-modern blues or pathos (the
end of all things modern, the philosopher as guru) is quite superfluous and rhetorical. The path is
8actually predictable. Philosophy has to learn from the Mind Techno-Science what mind is, not
what it is outside of them but how it is constructed, debated, investigated in the formation and
development of this inter-discipline. Philosophers of the mind have to internalize their
investigations within the mind sciences: they will probably have to become mind scientists in
order to become their epistemologists. There is one obvious reason to justify this tentative
assertion: many mind scientists have de facto become the epistemologists of their discipline and
this work inside their own practice has played a major role in the various developments of their
field. Regarding language, as there is a para-psychology, philosophers have been able in the past
to play the role of para-linguists: they pretended for a long time they were producing some
knowledge of language, even if it was and still is difficult to establish its clear status. Somehow
this prospect seems doomed regarding Mind Techno-Science: its epistemology is already at
work.
This is the reason why I think modern philosophy has no regeneration to expect from the
formation of a Mind Techno-Science. It is just another proof of the need and opportunity for
philosophy to reinvent itself as it always did throughout its history. But the present conjuncture
cannot be compared with the 1920’s, when the young Heidegger understood that the programme
of his master, Edmund Husserl, was impossible to fulfil and had become an utopia. The modern
philosophy of the subject could not be reconstructed in order to save the role of Reason as well as
the function of philosophy in the European civilization. The epistemic conjoncture was a
dramatic philosophical situation: if this reconstruction could not be properly accomplished, it
meant that the new sciences of the late 19th and early 20th centuries could not improve the
knowledge of the mind required for the progress of Humanity. Certainly Heidegger's solution has
been worse than what he denounced as impossible. But his thought has been thoroughly
developed, studied and enough understood. Who can pretend nowadays that philosophy can
discover what it was before (and therefore after) it was linked to science, the individual subject,
modern society, etc.? The Heideggerian solution is achieved, as well as its peudo-scientific
opposites. Philosophy cannot ignore the development of Mind Techno-Science.
Still, even if he provided the wrong answer, Heidegger has left us with the right question. The
question of thought is indeed the relevant one, as long as thought knows how to invent and
discover what it could be by experimenting with its position and relevance within the different
fields of knowledge. At present, philosophy seems only possible as thought producing itself in an
order of knowledge that nobody knows but that everybody practices in his research. Indeed,
thought is concerned by the mind sciences, but neither to be digested by them as their
epistemology, nor to ignore them and express its own possibility as fiction (fabula) or as a form
of literature (d'écriture).
9So the role of philosophy is not to reflect upon the mind sciences, but to think how thought is
concerned by the development of Mind Techno-Science, because it investigates what is thought
and what is thinking in a mind. This problem is made possible at the interaction between Mind
Techno-Science (AI, CS, neuro-physiology, etc.) and the practice of thought. What becomes
thinking when the various operations that have been traditionally defining thought as cognition
are being simulated and mechanized, i.e. become reproducible by artefacts and machines, even if
these artefacts are very abstract and formal ones? Then a non-modern distinction between
thought and intelligence becomes necessary, because in the present situation, the problem not
only concerns what is an intelligent behavior, but the very intelligence of thought. Intelligence
indeed has many forms and many levels, but it can only be known or investigated as a type of
response to some change in an environment so that the said intelligent subject or entity reaches,
through this intelligent process, a better (or new) adaptation to its environment and/or is capable
of preserving or developing its autonomy18. Thought, to be intelligible/intelligent,  requires to be
treated as a behavior or process. This very situation changes the relation between intelligence and
thought, it forces thought to gain a new intelligence of intelligence19 and it is profoundly
transformed by this situation. This experience seems to me one of the most radical questions for
philosophy at present.
This proves that the situation of thought and intelligence is at the core of Mind Techno-
Science, not only does it guide its development but it presides over the progressive association of
the different fields of research composing it today. It is basically a technological question since
the 1940’s and an analysis of this technology is able to clarify the question and situation of
thinking today, as well as some problems raised by the relations between AI, CS, virtual reality,
etc. I will call it Intelligence Technology (IT) in order to exhibit that it is not a technique as
means to realize some goals under the guidance of some ideal (Man, reason, spirit, etc.) or under
the power of some interest (economical, etc.). This technology generates within itself its
conception of thought and makes possible at its border another conception of thinking.  As
already shown, the Humanities, either as a modern ideal or as academic institutions, are not
directly concerned by this question, except through the very possibility and relevance of
philosophy.
5- A philosophical response
My question is: what is intelligence in Intelligence Technology? The answer is the opening of
another thought that can only be proved in action. This interaction within thinking, between
thought and its intelligence, is the question: no theory can be made, it has just to be tried out. But
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I certainly do not intend to take a heroic stand and enunciate what is thinking today. On the
contrary, the situation needs not to be dramatized, because it already occurred in the history of
philosophy, even if the problems to raise and the answers to provide have to be original. Indeed
in the early 17th century, Descartes saw that analytic geometry was introducing new ways of
organizing thinking, a new form of intelligence. It did not concern the mind itself but its
conception, not cognitive behaviors as the spontaneous activities of this mind, but a conception of
knowledge and thought overimposed on the mind. A new mind was not constructed, but a new
image of the mind in its act of thinking was constructed and a new definition of Man became
possible. This is what Descartes called method and he formulated its basic rules, not for them to
be simply applied and followed, but to exhibit that a new organization and practice of thought
were possible, that they could be explored and that the results of the exploration could transform
the different fields of knowledge, and even open up new ones. His work was very dependant on
the order of knowledge that he was at the same time contributing to establish. This "method"
could be called today a model of rationality20.
I probably have proven by now that I am no Descartes, but the situation of philosophy in his
epistemic conjuncture is quite similar to ours. IT is offering a new method and its basic rules or
steps can be formulated; they have been born in computer science and information technology
and my objective is to show that they play a major role in Mind Techno-Science. The description
of these rules will not teach anything new to anybody working in these fields, but this is precisely
the reason why it is so important to exhibit them21.
The form of what is given (investigated) is a behavior, a process or the function of a process.
So the function always supposes a process and every process expresses a function. The first step
of the method is the description of the process, i.e. its analysis in order to discern its different
phases, the elementary functions composing it. This analysis is the uncovering of the structure of
the process or of a function in a process. Structure can be symbolic or, according to the
connectionnist paradigm, subsymbolic. Indeed, the concept of structure designates a level in the
analysis of phenomena and not a specific type of formal theory. What is here investigated are the
properties of this level and this requires the development of original descriptive and explanatory
hypotheses. The key point in IT is the relation between this structure and the process from which
it was exhibited.
The second step is the expression of this structure in a formal language. It was traditionally a
mathematical one, but in IT the problem is not only the formal language itself, but the language
in which this structure adequately formalized can be programmed so that it can be reproduced
and therefore the function itself simulated. The very stake of this second step is the decisive
character of IT: once a structure is expressed (in the biotechnological sense) in a formal language,
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it can be programmed so that it becomes possible to interfere with it, to introduce variations in
order to better satisfy the function or to act eventually upon the function itself. This potential
action within the structure on the function raises fundamental questions. IT makes it possible to
express structures by interfering with them, to simulate or develop new versions of any function
or new functions that have in common a structure or some elements of one. To be able to analyze
the structure of a function in order to act upon it and so to find within this very structure
variations of the function or new functions is what is at stake and has to be thought. Functions
have in fact become virtual modalities of structures within a technology. In IT, structures are
neutral regarding the functions they have been gathered from. The consequences of this fact are
innumerable and effectively bring Humanity (the Human community) into a new age of its
evolution.
The third step is to select the medium capable of expressing the structure and its virtualities in
order to fulfil the function. The medium is the carrier of the structure, it can, for instance,
transmit it, introduce it into an artefact (any object, machine, etc.), etc. It actualizes the structure
in an artefact, in a given environment and for a certain task. Strictly speaking, the medium does
not carry or embody the structure itself but the structure being programmed to perform a function
or a set of functions. The carrier is somehow the matter in the Aristotelian sense, programmed or
programmable. The decisive point is that in IT the medium is neutral regarding the structure it
expresses, as the structure is neutral regarding the function. The same medium can carry different
structures and, more important for our objective, the same structure can be expressed by different
media.
To follow Descartes' suit, the fourth step is to program the function in a medium in order to
perform the function, reproduce its various steps and their order. The fifth step is to test the
program to make sure that every moment of the initial or intended process is adequately satisfied.
This is the effective situation of thought today and many points could now be clarified. The
first one concerns some aspects of what virtual reality means. IT brings in a radical new
conception of structure. Since the Greeks, it has been conceived as an autonomous and formal
level of determination in reality, expressed and treated by mathematics. Now structure is not only
the form of an object, of an entity or a process, it has become the intelligence of a process. This
technology manipulates the structure it analyzes and installs in it the results of these
manipulations. So in IT, a structure includes its virtualities and the analysis of a process generates
the virtualities of this process. This initial or actual process is to be conceived as the existing
actualization of a set of virtualities internal to the structure and constituting it. This is made
possible because the structure is programmable in a medium (or carrier) which overdetermines
the object, is overimposed to it, so as to reconstruct it and make an artefact out of it.
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The management of structures has become effective within their objects, entities or processes.
It opens a radical transformation of our conceptions of any being. From now on, any being
includes in itself its other modalities as part to its own being. Heidegger explained that things had
become objects for subjects who were perceiving them and reducing them to what they appeared
to them22. Now the objects are becoming artefacts: what the subject perceives is only one
modality of an artefact whose structure includes other modalities that exist only through IT. The
individuality of an artefact comprehends virtualities which can be actualized by a technology. So
virtual reality is not another reality, it is the reality. Reality has become virtual. This does not
mean that what is virtual is not real and that in post-modernity reality vanishes in the realm of
artefacts. It is another experience of reality: the actual or existing reality contains its virtuals,
other types of actualization. The object and the subject are overlapping.
Has therefore the substance of the subject become its structure which includes its potentials?
Yes, if this means that the subject is not any longer closed within one's self, some master of his
own being. But since Heidegger, philosophy has exhausted this interpretation. The answer is to
be found in the negative one: according to a model of rationality derived from IT, the structure
cannot be reduced to the form or the dunamis in Aristotle or to a program in genetics. The reason
is, according to the form of the given, that the analysis of structures in IT has as a purpose the
knowledge of functions or processes. IT transforms the conception of knowledge in a virtual
action inside the process on the functions it satisfies: the knowledge of the process is a virtual
action on the function23. So the clear objective of this type of knowledge is not to study pre-
programmed potentials already inscribed in a code or in the substance of a subject in order to
make or let it happen. It is not a return or a reconstruction of an Aristotelian paradigm. On the
contrary, the stake seems to be the opening of the structure, the introduction into it, through a
given technology, of virtualities that have to be interpreted and decided upon according to the
functions they are supposed to accomplish. In short, IT is not a study of what is already there but
of what can happen within what there is. One reaches the most controversial point of this paper, it
needs to be justified or falsified: the function sets the limit of the technology. IT seems to be a
technology that constructs its limit into itself.
The second point to be clarified is central to Mind Techno-Science and concerns the relation
between mind, brain, computer science, physics, neurology, etc. My remarks will be strictly
philosophical and do not pretend to have any practical epistemological relevance, they just follow
from the argumentation being built up24. My assumption is that Mind Techno-Science is
presently overdetermined by the model of rationality at the core of IT. It explains why mind is
conceived as cognition and that cognition is in its turn reduced to various cognitive behaviors or
processes like problem solving, belief, attention, perception, etc. In fact what falls under
cognition is an analysis of different cognitive structures. This examination can only be achieved
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in IT, at a symbolic or subsymbolic level, by their modelization in the field of computer science.
Therefore the problem is not that mind is or is not a computer, nor what sort of computer a mind
is. Certainly mind is not a computer, but computer science is at present the analysis of the
structure of cognitive processes. To understand this fact and not to fall into the trap of endless
controversies, one has to remember that Mind Techno-Science cannot be  thought as the present
and future substitute of philosophy or of Humanities. The whole (false) problem simply mixes
the level of the structure and the level of the medium.
It was just argued that the level of the structure is neutral regarding the level of the medium,
that a structure can be expressed by different carriers. From the point of view of IT, brain is a
carrier of cognitive structures and in this respect it is similar to any physical system, for instance
a machine, a computer or anything else which could perform the function described by the
structure. A medium can be physical, neurological, etc., and this does not matter at all. The
questions of the relation between minds and machines, brains and computers are often wrongly
formulated, because they ignore the level of the structure. So the relations between the different
fields of research in the Mind Techno-Science can be clarified if one acknowledges that this
inter-discipline is organized by a model of rationality having its source in IT. This is why I said at
the beginning that philosophy has not much to say, but that it was necessary to reduce some false
problems and let an epistemology of the Mind Techno-Science develop. Certainly philosophy has
a lot to learn from its development, but at present its main task is to learn how to stop asking the
wrong questions. I hope I have not made the situation worse.
6- Individuals, artefacts, societies
To end this paper, it is necessary to examine some of its limits and consequences. Is there
something alarming in these new virtualities offered to the power of Humanity or in-Humanity?
Yes, if one thinks the IT paradigm according to biological and genetic research, in reference to
the integrity of life or of the living being. In this case, epistemology is badly needed to explain
the differences and the limits of such a paradigm according to the different fields where it is
introduced and interferes. An epistemology proves its relevance when it is anchored in the very
evolution of a field of knowledge, articulated to the internal and external questioning of scientists
at work. Instead of deploring the end of the Humanities or to surreptitiously reconstruct them, it
would be more relevant to study why epistemology is incapable of providing the knowledge of
the sciences that our societies so badly need to understand themselves, their past as well as what
they are becoming 25. So to mingle the model of rationality provided by IT and the specific
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problems of molecular biology is false, as Descartes was wrong to assert that animals or bodies
were machines.
Indeed this problem forces us to return to the question of the order of knowledge in which
Intelligence Technology is developing. Mind Techno-Science is not the substitute of the
Humanities and IT is not a technology taking the place of Reason! At this point philosophy is
radically involved. This can be introduced by further developing the end of the difference
between subject and object which was one of the main features of the modern symbolic order.
Such a difference does not concern artefacts. Artefacts are no longer objects, they require to be
known from the inside, by distinguishing their structure and its virtualities, the medium
expressing it and, most of all, the functions they satisfy. Objects have become artefacts. The
subject is within the artefact, at the connection between the function and the structure. The
artefact as it is used in everyday practice by an individual is designed. Certainly the design of an
artefact is what appears to a subject, but it is conceived strictly according to the function and it
does not express either the structure, or even the carrier. The design is neutral regarding the
medium and the structure: the matter (which is not the medium!) of an artefact is selected
according to the function26.
The modern industrial conception of the object, "Form follows function", is taking a
completely different meaning, because form is not any longer the structure. Form simply
concerns the design. Artefacts are designed not for a substantive subject, knowing who he is or
what he wants, but for a subject who explores its virtualities in the discovery and practices of
artefacts. Individuals are not any longer in front of objects but in the middle of artefacts with
which they interact, which they use as parts of what they are. So what they are is the uses,
dispositions and practices they develop, exchange, adapt and invent: artefacts are the virtualities
of individuals and individuals develop virtual artefacts. The object has lost the substance that was
provided for it by the subject who was in front of it. Now objects are functions for virtual
individuals. A world of artefacts is an age when functions, uses, practices are what matters and
not substance and identity.
IT and its key concepts (structure, medium, design, function) are one of the main nodes in the
present order of knowledge. But the striking feature is the primacy of function. The technology
which is reducing the object to an artefact by managing its structure finds within itself its own
limit: function is the beginning and the end. Function is no longer dictated by the production, the
form by the matter, the structure by the form, because the manipulation of structures includes in
them virtualities which are in the end decided by social practices. The relation between
technology and society is radically transformed. I do not fall into a post-modern utopia of uses
and customs rising and overtaking technology by the people for the people, of a Humanity free
from the power of technology. I just explain that the future of IT lies not within IT but outside of
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it, in the social and cultural practices. The core feature of IT is that what is outside of it finds
itself introduced inside of it: its internal finality is what is external to it. To reach that point,
structures had to become flexible, transformable, manageable. They had to include virtualities. In
the end virtualities exist only according to the capacity of individuals to make them happen by
actualizing some of them. IT supposes a world of events, chance, opportunities and, of course,
accidents.
 Urgently, structures have to be differently thought. Apparently, economists have been
explaining this for the last twenty years: human capital is the main resource of high-technology
societies. But they have a restricted view of this capital when it is reduced to techno-scientific
skills, to the different competencies required by an industrial system based on information
technology.  Information is not intelligence. The virtuality of IT is that structures do not govern
any longer but are governed by the functions they have the potentials to fulfil. Once again,
function is the beginning and the end of IT. So the development of IT in societies, throughout
their different sectors, is closely determined by the capacity of the individuals to develop and
experience new and different behaviors, attitudes. These individual and collective innovations
diversify social functions, desires, needs and demands. IT is the capacity  to analyze them. The
consequences are innumerable: in the end, these functions are the basis of what is produced and
sold. But in North America, Europe and Japan, we see today a strong process of concentration in
information industries. Of course this trend might be necessary to meet the level of investment
required to implement globally information technology. But the objective and/or result of this
very concentration, making the headlines, is the control of the demand by the strong structuring
of the offer. To me, it seems to contradict the potentials of IT and conflict with the expected
social and economical consequences of information technology. A bad philosophy and a poor
epistemology might have today serious consequences.
The development of IT is determined by the capacity of our societies to offer to people a
higher degree of autonomy, of individual and collective freedom. This requires, of course, a
strong insistence on education, but more deeply it requires that our societies develop the
knowledge, the epistemology and philosophy that change them. This may not be any longer the
mission of the Humanities, but it is the task of the University. Ethical as well as political freedom
has a direct effect on the capacity of societies to change according to the rise of IT. The paradox
of Intelligence Technology is that it cannot submit society to its logic and requires freedom to
develop its virtualities. The future of IT is political, but such a political and social philosophy
requires to be based on a proper analysis of the order of knowledge. At the age of IT, the main
question of philosophy is political.
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7- Conclusion
This paper evolved from the conceptualization of Mind Techno-Science to a broader, more
abstract and more intricate problem at the core of our societies, of our capacities to understand
them and ourselves. Intelligence Technology is not a revolutionary technology, but a technology
in a revolutionary sense. I said earlier that philosophy was nowhere and everywhere, because it is
no longer localized in a subject, inside the mind, based on reason. I tried to show how philosophy
was uprooted and therefore free from a function that was so deeply rooted in its tradition that
since the end of the 19th century philosophy kept up the hope to modernize itself, i.e. to rebuild
its modern paradigm. In the end, it always turned out a failure. Post-modernism has been nothing
more but the way modern philosophy met its own limits, explored its presuppositions and finally
predicted its own end as its only way to survive.
To reconstruct the end of modern philosophy helps to understand the fascination surrounding
Mind Techno-Science. But it also opens up new possibilities. As thought cannot be separated
from intelligent behaviors, the knowledge (CS), technologization (AI) and industrialization
(R&D on artefacts, Intelligent Manufacturing, etc) of intelligence transform the relation between
thought and intelligence. Thought is changing because the emergence of MTS is dissolving the
dominant internal relation between thought and intelligent behaviors. Thought is thus
emancipated from a conception of intelligence which is becoming a techno-science. This
mutation and the resulting evolution of thought shape the present situation of philosophy. But for
that matter philosophy is not strictly, exclusively determined by MTS. Of course, philosophy
cannot ignore its rise and development, but it should not be reduced to an epistemology of mind
sciences. Neither has philosophy to prove (in vain) that thought has nothing to do with MTS, that
its sanctuary lies in literature, in Heidegger, etc. Each scientific revolution, till now, has offered
philosophy a possibility to reinvent itself. Once again it has become our common task27.
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